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15 Online word of mouth and its implications
for trademark law
Eric Goldman*
I. Introduction
It is already well-understood that the Internet is a major new medium for
human communication.1 It is less well understood how this new medium
should affect trademark law. Trademark law is wrestling with cybersquat-
ting/domainers,2 the sale of keyword-triggered ads and other high-profile
Internet trademark disputes, but I believe that “online word of mouth” poses
the most important challenge to Internet trademark law.
“Word of mouth” describes the process of transmitting information from
person to person. In commercial contexts, word of mouth involves consumers
sharing their opinions about marketplace offerings with each other, often
through everyday conversations.
Offline, consumer word of mouth plays a major role in the marketplace by
disciplining some brands and rewarding others, but a person’s views typically
reach only a limited number of people. In contrast, the Internet helps create
new word of mouth content (otherwise foreclosed by higher offline communi-
cation costs) and disseminate word of mouth to new and previously unreach-
able audiences.
The broad reach of online word of mouth gives consumers tremendous
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1
“The Internet is ‘a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication.’” Reno v Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (quot-
ing Am. Civil Liberties Union v Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
2 Domainers “make their living buying and selling domain names and turning
their Web traffic into cash.” Paul Sloan, Masters of their Domains, BUSINESS 2.0, Dec.
1, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2005/12/01/
8364591/index.htm.
power to influence brand perceptions,3 and this has put doctrinal pressure on
trademark law. Trademark law distinguishes between commercial and non-
commercial activity, but online word of mouth often does not neatly fit into
either category.4 As a result, courts are applying trademark law to online word
of mouth inconsistently, and the developing jurisprudence puts online word of
mouth at legal risk.
Trademark law’s inhibition of online word of mouth has adverse implica-
tions. Most importantly, trademark owners may be able to suppress or excise
negative word of mouth, allowing trademark owners to escape accountability
for their choices. Counterproductively, then, trademark law could hinder
consumers’ ability to make informed decisions that are critical to the operation
of marketplace mechanisms.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Section II discusses online word of
mouth and its implications for consumer formation of brand perceptions.
Section III considers the implications of online word of mouth for trademark
law. The Conclusion reiterates why it is important for trademark law to foster,
not squelch, online word of mouth.
II. The rise of online word of mouth, and the decline of trademark
owner control over consumer brand perceptions
Offline, trademark owners have a fair amount of control over consumer
perceptions of their brands. Online word of mouth undermines that control.
A. Offline factors that shape brand perceptions
Consumer brand perceptions are created by multiple sources, and no trade-
mark owner can completely control how consumers perceive its brand.
Nevertheless, trademark owners have significant control over some of the
offline influences:
Product experiences Consumers’ past experiences with a trademark owner’s
products affect consumer expectations about future interactions with the prod-
uct.5 Generally, trademark owners can affect consumer perceptions through the
quality of their goods/services.
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3 See GLEN URBAN, DON’T JUST RELATE—ADVOCATE: A BLUEPRINT FOR PROFIT
IN THE ERA OF CUSTOMER POWER (2005); cf. GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS:
HOW MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA,
BIG GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER GOLIATHS (2006).
4 Cf. Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 S.C.
L. REV. 682 (2007) (discussing how false advertising doctrines do not neatly apply to
consumer-generated promotions).
5 This is a key basis of the “goodwill” doctrine. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
Trademark owner’s advertising A trademark owner can advertise via many
media, ranging from broadcast/print advertising to marketing collateral to
event sponsorships. By specifying the ads’ content and placement, trademark
owners generally control the brand perceptions created by these ads.
Third party advertising Third party advertising can affect consumer percep-
tions of a trademark owner’s brand in a couple of ways. First, a competitor’s
ad may affect the trademark owner’s brand by expressly referencing/denigrat-
ing the trademark owner’s brand or through implicit associations/compar-
isons. Second, third party advertising can affect consumer demand for the
entire product class; those effects can be positive, such as when a manufac-
turer’s ad stimulates demand for the product, or negative, such as the anti-
tobacco public service advertising.
Third party advertising is generally beyond the trademark owner’s control.
However, it is subject to some significant limitations, including false advertis-
ing laws and a major advertiser’s threat to withhold future advertising as retal-
iation for running demand-reducing third party ads.6 Further, because
advertising is costly, typically advertising is undertaken only by profit-
maximizing commercial players, not by consumers or other non-profit actors.
(Public service ads like the anti-tobacco ads are a conspicuous anomaly.)
Retail interactions Consumer brand perceptions are influenced by interac-
tions in the retail context. Retailers, not upstream trademark owners, typically
control these interactions (except when the trademark owner sells direct-to-
consumer),7 but trademark owners nevertheless can influence the retail expe-
rience.
• Pricing. Price can signal quality to consumers,8 and pricing can deter-
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MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §2:18 (4th ed. 2003) (explain-
ing that “goodwill” means, among other things, “the lure to return,” “buyer momen-
tum” and the “expectancy of continued patronage”).
6 See Eric Goldman, My First Three Months in an Internet Start-Up, E-
COMMERCE L. REP., Sept. 2000 (broadcasters refused to run an Epinions television ad
that criticized Chrysler for fear of damaging the broadcasters’ relationships with
Chrysler, a major advertiser).
7 See generally Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers (forthcoming), available at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2007/774/brandspilloversv19.pdf) [hereinafter
Goldman, Brand Spillovers].
8 See, e.g., David J. Curry & Peter C. Riesz, Prices and Price/Quality
Relationships: A Longitudinal Analysis, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1998, at 36; Paul Milgrom
& John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON.
796 (1986).
mine post-purchase satisfaction9 and perceptions of brand exclusivity.10
Retailers set prices paid by consumers, but trademark owners can exer-
cise indirect control over these prices through wholesale pricing and by
restricting sales to discount retailers.11
• Placement. Retailers choose where to place products within stores,12
and these decisions can lead consumers to make various inferences and
associations that can affect brand perceptions.13 While retailers make
the final in-store placement decisions, trademark owners can influence
placement decisions through a variety of incentives and restrictions.14
• Advertising. Retailers generally may advertise the products they sell
under the trademark exhaustion/first sale doctrine.15 Trademark owners
can get oversight of some retailer choices through co-op advertising
programs.16
• Salesperson–Consumer Interactions. Retail salespeople’s statements
and conduct can affect consumer brand perceptions.17 Trademark
owners can conform the behavior of retail salespeople to some degree
through financial incentives and salesperson training (if permitted by the
retailer), and trademark owners can control some retail messaging
through product packaging or by providing retailers with marketing
collateral.
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9 See, e.g., Glenn B. Voss et al., The Roles of Price, Performance, and
Expectations in Determining Satisfaction in Service Exchanges, J. MARKETING, Oct.
1998, at 46.
10 This principle animated states’ Fair Trade Acts before the Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975 largely mooted them. See Note, Fair Trade Laws and Discount
Selling, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1951); Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
11 Trademark owners also can exercise some limited control over prices directly
through vertical price restrictions to the extent such restrictions are permissible.
12 See Goldman, Brand Spillovers, supra note 7.
13 See id.
14 See generally Marianne M. Jennings et al., The Economics, Ethics and
Legalities of Slotting Fees and Other Allowances in Retail Markets, 21 J.L. & COM. 1
(2001).
15 See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §25:43.
16 With co-op advertising programs, trademark owners subsidize retailer adver-
tising or make other resources available to retailers (such as licenses to copyrighted
material). See Co-op Advertising, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
encyclopedia/printthis/82096.html.
17 See, e.g., Brent Goff et al., The Influence of Salesperson Selling Behaviors on
Customer Satisfaction with Products, 73 J. RETAILING 171 (1997).
Editorial content Editorial content about goods and services, such as prod-
uct reviews, plays a crucial role in shaping consumer brand perceptions. For
example, good product reviews can boost sales, while bad reviews can sink
them.18
By definition, trademark owners are not supposed to be able to control
editorial content. Editorial content is expected to be free from outside influ-
ences, and many publishers voluntarily adopt policies limiting advertisers’
ability to influence editorial decisions.19 Nevertheless, trademark owners can
influence editorial content written about them:
• Marketers routinely “pay-to-play”20 despite legal doctrines (like anti-
payola laws) designed to restrict their ability to do so.
• Even when trademark owners do not directly pay-to-play, they can stim-
ulate and steer media coverage through public relations campaigns. In
extreme cases, media outlets will republish brand owner-supplied
content (such as video news releases) verbatim as “editorial” content.21
• Despite publisher/broadcaster policies separating “church and state,”
trademark owners can influence editorial decisions by threatening to
withhold advertising.22
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18 See Neil Terry et al., The Determinants of Domestic Box Office Performance
in the Motion Picture Industry, 43 SW. ECON. REV. 137 (2005) (recapping the litera-
ture). But see Alan T. Sorensen & Scott J. Rasmussen, Is any Publicity Good Publicity?
A Note on the Impact of Book Reviews, Apr. 2004, http://www.stanford.edu/
~asorense/papers/bookreviews.pdf (showing that even negative New York Times book
reviews increase sales).
19 See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994).
20 See Press Release, Manning Selvage & Lee, Almost 50% of Senior Marketing
Executives Said they have Paid for an Editorial or Broadcast Placement (June 13,
2006), http://www.mslpr.com/buzz/press_releases/pdf/Ethicspressrelease_062606.pdf.
For example, although payola is illegal, it still appears to occur in the radio industry.
See Chuck Phillips, Logs Link Payments with Radio Airplay, L.A. TIMES, May 29,
2001, at A1; Erin McClam, Sony Agrees to $10M “Payola” Settlement, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 25, 2005; Jeff Leeds, 2nd Music Settlement by Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2005, at C1.
21 See Diane Farsetta & Daniel Price, Fake TV News: Widespread and
Undisclosed, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, Apr. 8, 2006,
http://www.prwatch.org/fakenews/execsummary; David Barstow & Robin Stein, The
MESSAGE MACHINE: How the Government Makes News; Under Bush, a New Age of
Prepackaged TV News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at A1 (discussing U.S. govern-
ment-produced and -distributed video news releases). See generally BAKER, supra note
19, at 104–07 (criticizing television stations for accepting content produced by
marketers).
22 See BAKER, supra note 19; Blake Fleetwood, The Broken Wall; Newspaper
Coverage of its Advertisers, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1999.
Therefore, while much editorial content remains truly independent of trade-
mark owner influence, sometimes trademark owners can control or at least
guide editorial content.
Further, offline editorial content is expensive to produce and publish,
which limits the number of speakers who can afford to speak about the trade-
mark owner.23 This economic barrier to entry systematically blocks a lot of
brand-influencing content from being produced in the first place.
Consumer word of mouth Consumer word of mouth is another important
factor in shaping consumer brand perceptions.24 For some industries, such as
media products (i.e., books/movies/music)25 and restaurants,26 word of mouth
can make or  break businesses.
People routinely discuss brands with each other as part of their normal
interactions; according to one study, “people discuss about a dozen brands
each day.”27 Due to their sociability or expertise, some consumers (sometimes
called “brand advocates”)28 are more influential than other consumers. But
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23 See Larry Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of
Amateur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006).
24 See Michael R. Solomon, Consumer Behavior: Buying, having and being 379
(6th ed, 2004) (estimated that word of mouth influences 2/3 of consumer-good sales).
Yahoo.com, Long & Winding Road: The Route to the Cash Register (Apr. 2006),
http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/i/adv/lwr_06/long_and_winding_road.pdf (“Word
of mouth remains the most important factor in purchase decision making (particularly
in building awareness of specific brands or products).”) [hereinafter Yahoo.com, Long
& Winding]; The Rising Roar of Word-of-Mouth, EMARKETER, June 29, 2007,
http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?id=1005072&src=article1_newsltr.
25 Word of mouth repeatedly has been shown to affect consumers’ purchases of
books, movies and music. See Judith Chevalier & Dina Mayzlin, The Effect of Word of
Mouth on Sales: Online Book Reviews, J. MARKETING RES., Aug. 2006; Charles C.
Moul, Measuring Word of Mouth’s Impact on Theatrical Movie Admissions, Mar.
2006, http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~moul/pdf_drafts/wordofmouth.pdf; Yong Liu,
Word of Mouth for Movies: Its Dynamics and Impact on Box Office Revenue, J.
MARKETING, July 2006, at 74 (indicating that high quantity of word of mouth, regard-
less of whether it is positive or negative, increases movie box office receipts).
26 See Amy Hoak, Bill of Fare Game, MARKETWATCH, May 4, 2007,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/more-diners-dish-online-eateries/ story. aspx?
guid=%7B0D5DBF3E-17E6-4C21-B242-5AB03BD57E99%7D&dist= hplatest.
27 Louise Story, What We Talk About When We Talk About Brands, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2006.
28 See Press Release, Yahoo.com, Yahoo! and comScore Networks Reveals
Influential Consumers Can Be Reached Through Search, Social Media and
Communication Tools (Dec. 13, 2006), http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/
ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=222291 [hereinafter Yahoo.com, Influential Consumers];
see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000) (discussing “mavens” who play
a vital role in helping other consumers make marketplace decisions).
even the most influential brand advocates typically directly influence only the
few dozen people in their social network,29 often in time-consuming seriatim
conversations with one or a few people at a time.
Like editorial content, trademark owners cannot directly control word of
mouth very well.30 Indeed, this implicit independence—that word of mouth
reflects peers’ bona fide opinions, not a marketer’s economically motivated
views—gives extra credibility to word of mouth, which in turn makes it highly
influential to other consumers.31 Marketers can try to take advantage of word
of mouth’s extra credibility through techniques such as “buzz marketing,” but
these efforts often do not succeed.32
Conclusion This discussion can be summarized by Table 15.1
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29 See GLADWELL, supra note 28, at 179 (estimating that a social network rarely
exceeds 150 people). Solomon, supra. note 24 at 382 (an average disgruntled consumer
will share his/her negative opinions with nine people, only 13% of disgruntled
consumers will tell over 30 people).
30 See PlayMakers, LLC v ESPN, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1283–4 (W.D.
Wash. 2003) (word of mouth is not trademark owner-controlled “marketing”).
31 See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, Help for the Merchant in Navigating a Sea of
Shopper Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006; Story, supra note 27.
32 See Gerry Khermouch, Buzz Marketing, BUS. WK., July 30, 2001, at 54.
Table 15.1 Relationship between trademark owner control and brand
perception
Brand perception Effect on brand Trademark owner 
influences perceptions control
Product experiences Significant High
Trademark owner’s Potentially significant High
advertising
Third party advertising Often indirect Low
Retail interactions Significant Shared between
retailers and trademark 
owners
Editorial publication Significant Low in theory, non-
trivial in practice
Consumer word of Significant in aggregate, Low
mouth but each person’s
influence may be low
B. The Internet and online word of mouth
1. Amplification of word of mouth Online word of mouth differs from
offline word of mouth in several important ways. First, the Internet reduces
consumers’ costs to share their views. For example, a consumer can easily
disseminate an email or blog post to the consumer’s entire social network,33
which makes it easier (in terms of time and money) to share the consumer’s
views with more people. The ease of online communication also may encour-
age consumers to produce and share their brand perceptions more freely than
would have taken place offline, especially when such a communication would
be inhibited by geographic separation or social norms.
Second, through Internet dissemination, a consumer’s opinions can reach
people outside the consumer’s social network. Members of a consumer’s
social network can easily forward the message to their social network, quickly
expanding the reach of a single communication.34 If the consumer publishes
opinions to the web (via a blog or other online tool), the consumer can build a
readership that includes people who would not have been in the consumer’s
social network in physical space. Further, offline word of mouth is typically
ephemeral, but content published to the web can remain available indefinitely,
thus potentially influencing generations of future consumers.35
Third, new online intermediaries have emerged to systematically capture
and republish consumer opinions, such as merchant ratings in eBay’s feedback
forum36 and product reviews at Amazon.com, Epinions or Yelp.
Intermediaries may spur the creation of new incremental brand commentary
by soliciting consumer opinions (in some cases paying for those opinions),37
and intermediaries can provide useful metadata (such as identity/geography
authentication or ranking credentials) that helps readers assess the credibility
of those opinions. Intermediaries can also make online word of mouth easier
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33 See Yahoo.com, Influential Consumers, supra note 28 (brand advocates are
much more likely to use IM, Podcasts and email to disseminate their views than non-
advocates).
34 See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (using the unflattering term “cyber-
cascades” to describe the phenomenon).
35 See Posting of Carlo Longino to Techdirt, Online Criticism Isn’t Just Easy, It
Sticks Around Too, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070803/
123409.shtml.
36 See Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and
Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1407 (2003) (discussing
eBay’s feedback forum as a case study).
37 For example, Epinions pays a nominal amount of cash to reviewers. See
Earnings on Epinions.com, Epinions.com, http://www.epinions.com/help/faq/
show_~faq_earnings.
to use and compare by “summarizing” multiple consumers’ opinions into a
collective wisdom, such as a star rating.
2. Search engines and the competition for attention Search engines also
enhance the impact of online word of mouth. Typically, a search results page
has several “zones” of ads and content. For example, Google presents paid
advertising at the top and along the right side of a search results page and
presents “organic” search results along the left side. Both editorial38 and ad39
zones are sorted by proprietary algorithms. Search engines typically only
present ten organic results and up to ten ads per page. Typically, consumers
examine only the first page of search results.40 Thus, even if a keyword search
yields thousands or even millions of responsive results, consumers likely will
consider no more than the top twenty.41 With so much consumer attention and
cash at stake,42 competition for these top spots can be intense.
The competition-for-placement is exacerbated by players who traditionally
do not compete with the trademark owner for attention in the offline world.
For example, offline advertising by members of a trademark owner’s distrib-
ution channel (such as retailers and marketing affiliates) typically comple-
ments the trademark owner’s efforts. However, in search engines, trademark
owners may compete against their distribution channel members for the top
twenty spots. Trademark owners also compete with other commercial actors
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38 See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54
EMORY L.J. 507, 534–7 (2005) [hereinafter Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy].
39 For example, Google uses an “Ad Rank” that considers the advertiser’s will-
ingness to pay and a proprietary “quality score” that considers a variety of relevancy
factors. See How Are Ads Ranked?, Google.com, http://adwords.google.com/support/
bin/answer.py?answer=6111&query=ad%20rank&topic=&type=f.
40 See, e.g., Leslie Marable, False Oracles: Consumer Reaction to Learning the
Truth About How Search Engines Work, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, June 30,
2003, at 21, http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/false-oracles.pdf (in ethno-
graphic study, 88% of search results links were made from the first page of search
results).
41 Even within the first page, placement matters. The first editorial search result
may get ten times the number of clicks as the tenth search result. See Nico Brooks, The
Atlas Rank Report: How Search Engine Rank Impacts Traffic, ATLAS INSTITUTE
DIGITAL MARKETING INSIGHTS (June 2004), http://app.atlasonepoint.com/pdf/
AtlasRankReport.pdf.
42 See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 153–7 (2005) (describing the adverse busi-
ness consequences suffered by Neil Moncrief, operator of 2bigfeet.com, after being
kicked out of Google’s search index right before the holiday shopping season); Michael
Totty & Mylene Mangalindan, Web Sites Try Everything To Climb Google Rankings,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A1 (discussing how a retailer’s sales dropped 80% after
its Google ranking was reduced).
who are not normally directly competitive for offline advertising, such as
vendors of complementary goods; vendors catering to common consumer
interests; vendors of used goods; and publishers producing content about the
trademark owner.
More importantly for our purposes, trademark owners face competition for
search engine placement from consumers, gripers, critics and other speakers
who publish their views about the trademark owner but lack any profit motive
for doing so. These views, along with word of mouth distillations from inter-
mediaries like product review sites, can make their way into the top ten
organic search results (or, in some cases, may appear in the search ads). Some
searchers exposed to these search results will investigate further, in which case
this word of mouth content may shape the consumer’s brand perceptions.43
Indeed, searcher perceptions may be influenced merely by seeing word of
mouth content displayed in the search results itself, even if searchers do not
click on the link to investigate it further.44
Thus, in contrast to trademark owners’ relatively high level of control over
brand perceptions in the offline world, the Internet and online word of mouth
substantially degrade trademark owners’ control over consumers’ brand
perceptions. Indeed, a single consumer, through favorable search engine
placement, might influence thousands or even millions of potential consumers,
and because online word of mouth can survive indefinitely, the Internet
“remembers” a trademark owner’s historical choices and practices.
As a result, online word of mouth creates unprecedented accountability on
trademark owners for their decisions. Unfortunately, these effects are not
uniformly beneficial; online word of mouth can be inaccurate or unfair.
Consumers will need to develop mechanisms to distinguish trustworthy from
untrustworthy information. But even as consumers (and intermediaries)
develop these mechanisms, many consumers will use online word of mouth to
sharpen their marketplace decisions. In turn, the entire marketplace benefits as
online word of mouth improves trademark owner accountability.
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43 See Goldman, Brand Spillovers, supra note 7; see also Promatek Indus., Ltd.
v Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
44 See Maughan v Google Tech., Inc., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (Cal. App. Ct.
2006) (an accountant complained that the text of Google’s search result was harming his
business); Posting of Chris Bennett to 97th Floor Blog, 29 Fortune 100’s Are Letting
Google Tarnish Their Reputation, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.97thfloor.com/ blog/29-
fortune-100s-are-letting-google-tarnish-their-reputation/ (showing that many prominent
companies’ trademarks will prominently display negative search results when searched);
cf. Online Banner Advertising Raises Brand Awareness By 6% On Average, DYNAMIC
LOGIC: BEHIND THE CLICK®, June 2000, http://www.dynamic logic.com/na/research/
btc/beyond_the_click_0600.html (claiming that banner ads raise brand awareness by 6%
even if consumers do not click on the ads to investigate further).
III. Trademark consequences of online word of mouth
This section explores the trademark law implications of online word of mouth.
To focus the discussion, this section only considers trademark infringement,
not trademark dilution, the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act or
other trademark laws.
To establish a prima facie case of trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act, a trademark owner must establish (1) ownership of a valid trade-
mark, (2) priority of use, (3) the defendant used the trademark in commerce in
connection with the sale of goods or services, and (4) a likelihood that the use
will cause consumer confusion about the product’s source. After the trademark
owner establishes a prima facie case, the defendant can assert affirmative
defenses, including fair use. The Internet does not change the ownership or
priority analyses, but it raises important new issues about the other two
elements of a trademark infringement claim.
A. Use in commerce
1. Defined The Lanham Act’s trademark infringement provisions refer-
ence “use in commerce” three separate times: §32(a) (infringement of regis-
tered marks); §43(a) (infringement of unregistered marks) and §45
(definitions). §45 defines “use in commerce” as:
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to
reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to
be in use in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays asso-
ciated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods
makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods
or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and
the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one
State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the
services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.45
This definition has plenty of ambiguity, especially the somewhat tautolog-
ical definition of services (“use in commerce” means “used . . . in the sale or
advertising of services”). However, it requires that the use take place in the
“ordinary course of trade,” and it implies that the use should be visible to
consumers either on the product packaging or in marketing collateral.
414 Trademark law and theory
45 15 U.S.C. §1127.
From a purely textualist perspective, this definition should govern all
references to “use in commerce” in the statute. After all, §45’s preamble
says that the definitions apply “[i]n the construction of this chapter [Chapter
22, which governs trademarks], unless the contrary is plainly apparent from
the context. . . .” Where the statute uses the phrase “use in commerce,” the
§45 definition should apply by its terms.
Prof. McCarthy rejects the textualist approach, calling it a “robotic statu-
tory reading divorced from the history and meaning” of trademark law.46 He
views the §45 definition as a “quaint” “anachronism” that, when applied to the
§32(a) and §43(a) “use in commerce” references, leads to an “awkward and
inept” result.47 Instead, Prof. McCarthy believes the plaintiff’s prima facie
infringement case does not contain a separate “use in commerce” element.48
Profs. Dinwoodie and Janis agree with Prof. McCarthy about the lack of a “use
in commerce” element and the merit to rejecting the textualist approach,49
arguing that such an approach would make language in §33(b)(4) (the trade-
mark fair use provision) superfluous and, as a result, would be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that language in the recent
Supreme Court KP Permanent ruling.50
Similarly rejecting a textualist approach, some courts have ignored the §45
“use in commerce” definition entirely,51 instead construing the §32 and §43
references to “use in commerce” to be coextensive with Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause.52 This expansive argument proceeds as follows:
• Congress needs Constitutional authorization to enact the Lanham Act.
• The Intellectual Property Clause53 does not provide that authorization;
it only authorizes Congress to enact patent and copyright protection.54
• Instead, Congress enacts the Lanham Act under the Commerce Clause.
• Congress’ references to “use in commerce” are designed to keep the
statute within its Commerce Clause authority.
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49 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007).
50 K.P. Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v Lasting Impression, Inc., 543 U.S. 111
(2004).
51 See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005);
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v Bucci, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
SMJ Group, Inc. v 417 Lafayette Rest. LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
53 Id., §8, cl. 8.
54 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
• As a result, the courts interpret the “use in commerce” language as
extending the statute to the maximum extent of Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause.
In support of this argument, some courts55 have cited the §45 definition of
“commerce,” defined as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress.”56 This expansive reading relies on an odd method of statutory
construction.  To reach this result, the courts read the “use in commerce”
language in §32 and §43 as “use in commerce” where only the word commerce
is defined in §45 even though §45 also contains a definition of the entire
phrase “use in commerce.” If Congress had intended for §32 and §43 to use
only the §45 definition of “commerce” instead of the “use in commerce” defi-
nition from the same section, it certainly did not make this intent very clear.
As this discussion illustrates, there is no ideal reading of the statute;57 any
reading of the statute exposes drafting anomalies or creates statutory conflicts.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that courts cannot agree on the definition, and
their efforts are likely to be irresolute. It is likely that definitive resolution will
come only from the Supreme Court or Congressional action.
Even if courts read the “use in commerce” definition expansively, the
statute requires that the trademark be used “in connection with a sale of goods
or services.” At minimum, this language contemplates that some set of non-
commercial activity would be outside the reach of trademark infringement.
However, some courts have taken an expansive view of this phrase as well.
For example, in PETA v Doughney,58 Doughney created a parody website
entitled “People Eating Tasty Animals” at peta.org. Doughney did not derive
revenues from the website, but the court found a connection to the sale of
goods/services because (1) the peta.org website “prevented users from obtain-
ing or using PETA’s goods or services,” and (2) the website had uncompen-
sated, editorially selected links to thirty third-party commercial websites.
Thus, by combining two expansive statutory interpretations, the Lanham
Act can reach unambiguously non-commercial activity—such as the
Doughney case, involving a parody website that was not making money,
advertising third parties, or interfering with the trademark owner’s ability to
make money.
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57 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use
Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1713 (2007) (“no one can settle on what ‘trademark
use’ means”).
58 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th
Cir. 2001).
2. “Use in commerce” gone awry The result of a double-expansive inter-
pretation of trademark “use in commerce” creates significant legal risks for
online word of mouth for at least two reasons. First, in some cases, consumers
may legitimately generate revenues from online word of mouth. Individual
consumers self-publishing their content can easily sign up to advertising
programs, such as Google’s AdSense program,59 that pay them to display third
party ads on their websites. These ad programs can help consumers defray
their web hosting costs and, in some cases, provide some modest compensa-
tion for their time. In this respect, consumer-publishers are just like newspa-
per reporters who are paid a salary or royalty for writing a story about a
trademark owner. Yet, unlike these journalists, under an expansive/double-
expansive reading of the “use in commerce” requirement, consumers who
disseminate their brand-related opinions via an ad-supported website could
satisfy the trademark use in commerce standard.60
Second, courts have found a trademark use in commerce even when a
consumer engaged in no commercial activity at all. This was illustrated by
Doughney (discussed above) and emphasized by Planned Parenthood v
Bucci.61 In that case, an anti-abortion griper operated a website at planned-
parenthood.com. On the site, he called visitors’ attention to an anti-abortion
book by a third party author. This “plug” was uncompensated, but it never-
theless satisfied the court’s double-expansive interpretation of use in
commerce. In other words, the single word of mouth reference to a commer-
cial product pushed Bucci’s entire gripe site into the Lanham Act’s ambit.
The Bucci case may represent the zenith (nadir?) of use in commerce over-
reaching. Two recent online griper appellate decisions—Bosley62 and
Lamparello63—have diverged from Bucci and Doughney and excused online
griping. Yet, amidst the good news for gripers, there remain troubling signs
about the applicability of the use in commerce doctrine to online word of
mouth.
In Bosley, Kremer (a dissatisfied customer of the plaintiff) set up a gripe
site at bosleymedical.com. Kremer did not try to generate revenues, and the
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59 https://www.google.com/adsense/. Another example is the Amazon Affiliates
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consumer confusion will be addressed in Section III(B).
61 Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
834 (1998).
62 Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
63 Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1069 (2006).
site’s only outlinks were to Kremer’s lawyers and to a sister site operated by
Kremer, which in turn had links to a newsgroup that displayed ads for the
plaintiff’s competitors. On these facts, the court could have simply concluded
that this was a non-commercial gripe site which was categorically outside the
Lanham Act’s express terms. Instead, the court evaluated the nature of the
outlinks and, only after the court was satisfied that Kremer had made the
“right” type of links, determined that there was no use in commerce.
In Lamparello, Lamparello set up a gripe site at fallwell.com to critique
Rev. Jerry Falwell’s attitude towards gays. The parties stipulated that
“Lamparello has never sold goods or services on his website.”64 However, at
one point, Lamparello had an apparently uncompensated outbound link to an
Amazon.com web page where visitors could purchase a book recommended
by Lamparello. On these facts, Lamparello easily should have qualified as a
non-commercial actor. Yet, the court punted on the use in commerce issue,
calling it a “difficult question,”65 and instead found for the griper on likeli-
hood of confusion grounds. In other words, the defendant’s recommendation
of a commercial product through a single outbound link, even if uncompen-
sated and for a limited period of time, made the use in commerce question a
difficult one.
3. A normative view of “use in commerce” Although the Bosley and
Lamparello cases ultimately reached the right outcome on trademark infringe-
ment, those cases (and others)66 have turned the use in commerce element into
a bizarre link-counting witchhunt where a “wrong” link may flip on Lanham
Act coverage like a light switch. Not only does this discourage websites from
providing links that are beneficial to users, but it is significantly overinclusive,
leading to substantial risk of bona fide non-commercial activity being deemed
a use in commerce.67
Instead, a use in commerce should occur only when the defendant uses the
plaintiff’s trademark to designate the source of the defendant’s goods or
services.68 This source-designation requirement is explicit in the definition of
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66 See, e.g., Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc. v Discovery Computing, Inc., 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21978 (D. Utah 2007) (another griper case where the court engaged
in link-counting).
67 Cf. Nissan Motor Co. v Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.
2004) (outlinks to critical commentary are not “commercial,” and restrictions against
such outlinks violated the First Amendment).
68 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1681 (2007).
a “trademark,” defined in §45 as a word (or other symbol) used “to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”69 This defi-
nition constitutes a predicate requirement for protectable rights, but it also is a
constituent requirement of an infringement. Section 45’s definition of “use in
commerce” references the definition of “trademark,” thus implicitly requiring
that the defendant cannot infringe unless the defendant makes a source-desig-
nating use of the third party trademark.
Admittedly, the source-designation requirement for a “use in commerce”
creates some problems even as it solves others. First, as Dinwoodie and Janis
have noted, this statutory interpretation would make some language in the
descriptive fair use provisions of §33(b)(4) superfluous (specifically, the
exclusion for when the defendant is using the trademark “otherwise than as a
mark”).70 However, other statutory interpretations create other conflicts as
well. Until Congress fixes its drafting mistakes, something has to give.
Second, Dinwoodie and Janis have also noted that a source-designation
requirement creates the risk that defendants could confuse consumers but cate-
gorically avoid trademark liability.71
Third, consumers routinely do not understand the “source” of goods or
services they are buying—even when no one is trying to cloud the issue—
because trademarks rarely designate a specific manufacturing plant or the
work of specific personnel, and trademark owners make source determinations
difficult through trademark licensing, co-branding, merchandising and brand
ownership by low-profile conglomerates. Further, it is not clear how much
consumers even care about a product’s “source” when making marketplace
choices. So predicating the trademark use in commerce doctrine on source
designation may be, at best, somewhat anachronistic.
Nevertheless, descriptively, the source-designation approach is consistent
with the statute, and normatively, the approach provides an efficient way to
analyze some socially beneficial behavior involving trademarks that has been
vexing courts. Specifically, to the extent that the Lanham Act requires a defen-
dant to designate the source of its products using the plaintiff’s trademark,
some types of activities do not qualify as uses in commerce:
a. No goods/services If a defendant does not offer any of its own goods or
services in the marketplace, its actions should be outside the use in commerce
standard by definition. Many consumers disseminating online word of mouth
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should qualify under this standard, including gripers such as Bucci, Doughney,
Kremer and Lamparello. In these cases, the consumers are espousing their
opinions, not offering goods or services.72 As a result, any trademark refer-
ences contained in their online word of mouth cannot designate source of the
consumer’s (non-existent) goods/services.73
b. Referential uses Even when a word of mouth disseminator is offering its
own goods and services, it is not making a trademark use in commerce when
it uses the third party trademark for its referential meaning of describing/iden-
tifying the trademark owner’s goods or services.74
An offline example illustrates this point. Newspapers offer their goods in
the marketplace. In editorial stories they publish (and sell), such as product
reviews, newspapers use third party trademarks for their referential value.
These trademark references do not designate the newspaper’s source and thus
do not qualify as a use in commerce of those trademarks they editorially refer-
ence—even if the trademark is prominently displayed in a first page headline,
which might prompt some new incremental customers to buy single copies of
the newspaper to learn more about the trademark owner; and even if the news-
paper places ads adjacent to the story.
As this example illustrates, a publication’s commerciality does not dictate
the trademark law characterization of trademark references made in the publi-
cation. So long as references to third party trademarks are not designed to
designate the publication’s goods or services, they do not qualify as a use in
commerce.
This is true in the online context as well. Even if online word of mouth is
published as part of a commercial endeavor (such as an ad-supported website),
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72 Admittedly, some judges might circularly characterize the dissemination of
word of mouth as a service of disseminating word of mouth. See SMJ Group, Inc. v
417 Lafayette Rest. LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). However, in effect this
tautology eliminates the element. Compare The Freecycle Network, Inc. v Oey 505
F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007) (disparaging a trademark owner did not constitute a trademark
use in commerce).
73 In contrast, word-of-mouth marketing can constitute a trademark use in
commerce when it is part of a trademark owner’s marketing campaign to sell its goods
and services. See Allard Enters., Inc. v Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d
350, 359 (6th Cir. 1998).
74 See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir.
2007) (“Lycos is not using the ‘UCSY’ trade name ‘on’ a product (or business) at all,
but is simply referring to the existing company that has adopted that trade name.”).
The exception is when the defendant’s reference to a third party trademark is part of
the defendant’s source designation of its own products/services, in which case the
reference may qualify as a nominative use. See infra Section III(C).
referential trademark uses should still be excused.75 Thus, there is no reason
to engage in link-counting exercises; even a for-profit website with hundreds
of compensated links does not make a use in commerce when it uses third
party trademarks referentially.
c. Imperceptible uses Online, web publishers can reference trademarks in
a manner that consumers cannot perceive. For example, web publishers can
include trademarks in their “keyword metatags,” which are index terms read-
able by a search engine’s robots but generally not visible to web visitors.76
Judicial scrutiny of these “imperceptible uses” typically has been unfavor-
able. For example, courts often have treated inclusion of third party trade-
marks in the keyword metatags as a per se infringement77—in many cases
ignoring the use in commerce requirement entirely.
However, if consumers do not “perceive” the trademark’s inclusion in the
keyword metatags, then the metatags do not act as a source designator and the
metatag usage should be irrelevant to the trademark analysis. Further, to the
extent that search engines ignore keyword metatags—the case with Google’s
and Microsoft’s search engines, among others78—the keyword metatags do
not have any functional consequence at all, and therefore they are incapable of
acting as source designators. As a result, the inclusion of a third party trade-
mark as a keyword metatag, without more, should not constitute a use in
commerce.79
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Commercial Referential Trademark Uses (Rescuecom v Google Amicus Brief
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Description metatags are another metatag type that has created some confusion in the
courts. In some cases, search engines may display description metatags verbatim as
part of search results, see id., in which case the description metatags act like ad copy.
In other cases, search engines ignore description metatags, see id., in which case they
are imperceptible like keyword metatags.
77 See, e.g., Tdata Inc. v Aircraft Technical Publishers, 411 F. Supp. 2d 901
(S.D. Ohio 2006).
78 See Posting of Danny Sullivan to Search Engine Land, Meta Keywords Tag
101: How to “Legally” Hide Words On Your Pages For Search Engines, Sept. 5, 2007,
http://searchengineland.com/070905-194221.php.
79 See Site Pro-1 v Better Metal, 2007 WL 1385730 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Posting
of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Outdated Metatags Don’t
Infringe—Pop Warner v NH Youth Football & Spirit Conference, Sept. 25, 2006,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/09/outdated_metata.htm.
4. Procedural considerations Even if a court improperly characterizes the
defendant’s behavior as a use in commerce, the defendant’s use often will not
create a likelihood of consumer confusion or may qualify for the trademark
fair use defense. Assuming these defendants will prevail in any case, does it
matter what doctrinal factor is used to resolve the case?
With respect to trademark infringement and online word of mouth, the
answer is yes. First, there is the matter of judicial economy. Trademark law
lacks many bright-line rules, but a clear rule delimiting its boundaries would
save some wasted resources. For example, the multi-factor likelihood of
consumer confusion test is a poor substitute for screening out non-trademark
uses because consumer confusion is typically a fact question that is not easily
resolved on summary judgment.80 Thus, litigating consumer confusion in
these cases increases defendants’ costs, requires more adjudicative resources,
and reduces predictability. Also, as discussed below, some courts have
misused judicial heuristics (such as the initial interest confusion doctrine) to
eviscerate the consumer confusion requirement, making the use in commerce
doctrine a better safeguard against overexpansive cases.
Second, plaintiffs have the burden to establish the prima facie elements of
a trademark infringement, but defendants have the burden to establish any
defenses such as trademark fair use. This burden-shifting further puts defen-
dants at risk of losing meritorious defenses. Further, as discussed below, some
defenses (such as the nominative use doctrine) are not universally recognized,
so these defenses may not be doctrinally robust enough to provide adequate
coverage for non-use circumstances.
Therefore, other trademark doctrines are not an adequate substitute for
rigorous scrutiny of the trademark use in commerce requirement. If the defen-
dant is not making a trademark use, courts should resolve the case on that
basis.
5. Source designation and intermediaries So far, this subsection has
considered trademark references by consumers themselves. The use in
commerce doctrine is also important to the liability of online intermediaries
that disseminate online word of mouth, including product review sites and
search engines.
a. Product review websites Product review websites, such as Epinions or
Yelp, allow their users to opine on marketplace offerings. Typically, a prod-
uct review site builds a catalog (“taxonomy”) of products and services and
allows consumers to post opinions (the site may also contain product reviews
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from other sources). To build this taxonomy, product review sites necessarily
must reference third party trademarks, which can result in these trademarks
appearing in the site’s URLs, page titles, metatags and site text. Consumer-
supplied product reviews can create revenue for the websites by helping the
website get good placement in the search engines, which can increase adver-
tising revenue and, if (as Amazon does) the site sells products as a retailer, by
improving conversion-to-sale.81
A product review website’s trademark uses might be excused by trademark
exhaustion or nominative use doctrines. Either way, like other referential uses,
taxonomical references should not constitute trademark uses in commerce
because they do not attempt to designate the source of the product review
sites’ services (irrespective of the product review site’s commerciality).82 This
narrow construction of trademark use in commerce allows product review
sites to build and organize useful databases of online word of mouth.
b. Search engines Search engines often sell and display advertising in
response to users’ search keywords. Courts have irreconcilably split about
whether selling or buying ads triggered by trademarked keywords constitutes
a trademark use in commerce,83 which is not surprising given the statutory
ambiguity discussed above.
Descriptively, keyword triggering should not constitute a use in commerce
because neither search engines nor advertisers use keywords as source desig-
nators of their goods/services. Instead, keywords are the functional equivalent
of product review websites’ taxonomical structures. Like other types of refer-
ential uses, keywords act as the lingua franca for interested consumers to
match with relevant content. Also, because consumers do not “see” the trig-
gering, it lacks the perceivability to designate source.84
Normatively, keyword triggering creates a new and important way for
consumers to obtain helpful content not controlled by the trademark owner.
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83 See Eric Goldman, Keyword Law, http://www.ericgoldman.org/Resources/
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84 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005);
Merck & Co. v Mediplan Health Consulting, 2006 WL 800756 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Rescuecom Corp. v Google, Inc., 2006 WL 2811711 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). A trademark
reference in ad copy could constitute a use in commerce, Hamzik v Zale
Corp./Delaware, 2007 WL 1174863 (N.D.N.Y. 2007), but each specific ad must be
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Like other examples of online word of mouth, this material can increase
competitive pressures on trademark owners, hold them accountable for their
choices, and allow marketplace mechanisms to work.
Although selling keywords should not be a use in commerce, search
engines might be contributorily liable if advertisers commit trademark
infringement.85 Advertisers do not make a use in commerce solely by purchas-
ing keywords (due to the lack of perceivability), but an advertiser’s overall
activities (keyword purchase + ad display + product sales) collectively could
infringe. Even so, search engines generally should not be contributorily liable
because they only provide ad space and thus do not control the instrumentali-
ties advertisers use to infringe.86 In the rare situations where search engines
may have sufficient control over such instrumentalities, they should get the
benefit of the printer/publisher remedy exclusion,87 which limits remedies to
a prospective injunction (no damages).
B. Likelihood of consumer confusion
Assessing consumer confusion about product source is an inherently inexact
process. Factfinders try to create a hypothetical person (“the reasonable
consumer”) and speculate how that person would perceive the litigants’
marketing. Then, factfinders may find infringement when a small minority of
hypothetical consumers are likely to be confused,88 and even if (1) no
consumer is actually confused, and (2) many consumers completely under-
stand the relationship between the litigants. Collectively, these factors increase
the risk that factfinders will erroneously find a likelihood of consumer confu-
sion.
Online, likelihood of confusion determinations are even more likely to
skew towards finding infringement. First, consumers vary their search
methodologies depending on their search objectives,89 and different
consumers seeking to accomplish the same objective may choose different
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88 See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §23:2.
89 See Andrei Broder, A Taxonomy of Web Search, http://www.acm.org/sigs/
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search methodologies.90 Search methodology heterogeneity makes it difficult
to establish a reasonable consumer baseline.
Second, factfinders try to infer an online consumer’s search objectives with
minimal data from the searcher. Offline, many consumer searches take place
within a context, such as a retail environment, that adds crucial data about the
searcher’s possible intent.91 Online, in general-purpose search engines such as
Google, searchers manifest their objectives through a single decontextualized
search term—which does not provide enough data to support reliable infer-
ences about those objectives.
In response to the dearth of reliable data about consumer intent, courts
sometimes bypass the traditional multi-factor likelihood of consumer confu-
sion test and instead use the “initial interest confusion” (“IIC”) doctrine as a
heuristic. In 1999, the Ninth Circuit defined IIC as “the use of another’s trade-
mark in a manner reasonably calculated to capture initial consumer attention,
even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion,”92
but courts cannot agree on a single definition of IIC,93 making the doctrine
unusually plastic.
In some cases, IIC has subtly changed the basic thrust of the court’s
consumer confusion inquiry. Instead of examining consumer confusion about
product source, courts applying IIC may focus on consumer confusion about
content source.94 Content source confusion occurs when consumers experi-
ence confusion about why they are seeing the content presented to them, even
though this content does not cause consumers to make any errors in their
marketplace choices. Content source confusion cannot be cured by subsequent
clarification (as the Promatek court said, the defendant “cannot unring the
bell”),95 so disclaimers or subsequent corrective information may not
adequately dispel the confusion.
Content source confusion is problematic for numerous reasons, including the
fact that consumers are routinely confused about why they see any particular
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91 See Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note 38, at 527–8.
92 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).
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itive diversion. See Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note 38, at 563.
94 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d
1020 (9th Cir. 2004); Promatek Indus. v Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
95 Promatek, 300 F.3d, at 808.
content96 and because there is little social science support for the proposition
that content source confusion harms trademark owners.
Further, the content source confusion doctrine can adversely affect online
word of mouth. Because online word of mouth competes with trademark
owners’ content for consumer attention, consumers may not immediately
understand the source of online word of mouth, even if subsequent consumer
investigation clears this up. As a result, some courts have, in fact, found that
online word of mouth (or analogous content) creates IIC.97
For reasons I have explained elsewhere,98 courts should ditch any heuris-
tics, such as IIC, for evaluating consumer confusion and instead continue to
apply the venerable multi-factor likelihood of consumer confusion test. Thus,
courts evaluating consumer confusion should carefully consider the totality of
the circumstances, including consumer expectations and all of a defendant’s
behavior (not just single actions, such as a keyword purchase).
C. Fair use defenses
Descriptive fair use occurs when the defendant describes its product using a
descriptive trademark for its dictionary meaning.99 For example, the trade-
marked phrase “sealed with a kiss” for lip gloss does not prevent other compa-
nies from informing their consumers that they can “seal it with a kiss” when
that phrase describes exactly what consumers should do.100
Nominative use occurs when the defendant designates its product source
using a third party trademark for its referential meaning. According to the
Ninth Circuit, nominative use occurs when:
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2006) (physical-space distribution of gripe leaflet).
98 See Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note 38, at 575–95.
99 It is a defense to infringement to use “a term or device which is descriptive of
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party,
or their geographic origin.” 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4).
100 See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125
F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1997).
• The defendant cannot readily identify its offering without referencing
the trademark;
• The reference uses only as much of the trademark as is reasonably
necessary to identify the offering; and
• The reference does not suggest the trademark owner’s sponsorship or
endorsement.101
Nominative use cases often involve media products where the media
content relates to third party trademarks. For example, a book entitled “The
Unofficial Guide to Maximizing Sales on the eBay Website” should qualify as
nominative use.
However, the nominative use doctrine is not universally accepted.
Although it is recognized in the Ninth Circuit,102 the Sixth Circuit declined to
adopt the doctrine in 2003.103 As a result, defendants cannot universally rely
on its availability, especially given the unsettled nature of Internet jurisdiction.
Because both trademark fair use doctrines are narrow in scope, some legit-
imate activities, such as parody or comparative advertising, may fall outside
their boundaries. Further, defendants must carry the burden of fair use as an
affirmative defense. As a result, fair use is often unhelpful for trademark
defendants.
Online word of mouth activities can directly implicate trademark fair use
(especially nominative use) because consumers must refer to trademarks to
opine about them. Typically, these references should not constitute a “use in
commerce” because they do not designate the source of the consumer’s offer-
ings. When courts mischaracterize online word of mouth as a trademark use in
commerce, they put a lot of doctrinal pressure on the narrow nominative use
doctrine, and this increases the risks of erroneous outcomes. The use in
commerce doctrine is better suited to do this heavy lifting.
In limited cases, online word of mouth does constitute a trademark use in
commerce. For example, a recent case104 involved Acomplia Report,105 an ad-
supported online publication of news and commentary about Sanofi-Aventis’
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101 See New Kids on the Block v News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992).
102 See, e.g., id.; Playboy Enters., Inc. v Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
103 See PACCAR Inc. v TeleScan Techs. L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003).
104 Med. Week News, Inc. v Sanofi-Aventis Group (N.D. Cal. complaint filed
June 27, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/medweek_v_sanofi/ acom-
plia_initial_complaint.pdf. The case ultimately settled. See News Website Can Keep
Domain Name After Trademark Fight, EFF.org, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.eff.org/
news/archives/2005_11.php#004143.
105 http://www.acompliareport.com/.
anti-obesity drug (rimonabant) marketed as Acomplia.106 The Acomplia
Report actively promotes its business using a source designator that includes
a third party trademark, so it may be using the trademark “Acomplia” in
commerce. Nevertheless, the publication title should qualify as a nominative
use. The publication title accurately explains its editorial focus to consumers,
in ways that alternative titles without the brand name would not do. Further,
the Acomplia Report generates and disseminates online word of mouth about
the drug that acts as a valuable marketplace resource, and the publication title
increases the chances that consumers can find this word of mouth information.
As this example illustrates, trademark fair use doctrines have an important role
to play in preserving online word of mouth, but only as a narrow complement
to a rigorous application of the use in commerce doctrine.
IV. Conclusion
In theory, trademark law helps consumers make good choices in the market-
place. In practice, misapplication of trademark law can hinder consumer deci-
sion-making, and this chapter illustrates those risks. Online word of mouth can
play an essential marketplace-disciplining/rewarding function for brands
(rewarding the good; punishing the bad),107 but trademark law can interfere
with that mechanism, acting as a tool to curb the production and dissemination
of online word of mouth.
With these tools, trademark owners can selectively excise content from the
Internet—favorable word of mouth can stay, but unfavorable word of mouth
must go.108 The resulting content purge can produce “lopsided” brand percep-
tions of trademark owners where consumers do not learn about negative
aspects of brands.109 This allows trademark owners to mitigate marketplace
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106 http://en.sanofi-aventis.com/events/event1/en/about.asp.
107 See URBAN, supra note 3; Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Zarsky, E-Contract
Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984765.
108 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 68, at 1700–01; Bob Sullivan, Companies’
Online Reputation Scrubbed Clean, MSNBC, Sept. 11, 2007. In fact, negative word of
mouth has a disproportionately higher impact on consumer perceptions, Solomon,
supra note 24, at 381–2, making it even more compelling for trademark owners to
suppress.
109 There are countless examples of trademark owners’ efforts to use trademark
law to suppress unwanted criticism, as the numerous lawsuits and UDRP actions over
[trademarkowner]sucks.com attest. A more poignant example may be BidZirk v Smith,
where a trademark owner sued a disgruntled customer for blogging about his negative
experiences with the company. BidZirk, L.L.C. v Smith, 2006 WL 3242333 (D.S.C.
2006) aff’d, 2007 WL 664302 (4th cir. 2007) dismissed 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C.
2007). Fortunately, the district and appellate courts in the BidZirk case have realized
the importance of Smith’s blog post, but these risks will continue to arise frequently.
recourse for their poor choices. Taken to an extreme, the depletion of negative
online word of mouth reduces the utility of the Internet as a credible informa-
tion resource, forcing consumers to seek other information sources that may
have higher search costs.
This result could turn trademark law on its head—instead of reducing
consumer search costs, trademark law could increase those costs. Fortunately,
courts sensitive to the value of online word of mouth can find ways to avoid
this undesirable outcome.
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